McCaffery, James v. Cardinal Logistics by Tennessee Court of Workers Compensation Claims
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
and Workers' Compensation Appeals Board Law
10-28-2015
McCaffery, James v. Cardinal Logistics
Tennessee Court of Workers Compensation Claims
Follow this and additional works at: http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_workerscomp
This Expedited Hearing by the Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Court of Workers' Compensation Claims is a
public document made available by the College of Law Library and the Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Court of
Workers' Compensation claims. For more information about this public document, please contact wc.courtclerk@tn.gov.
IN THE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS 
AT MEMPHIS 
JAMES MCCAFFERY, ) Docket No.: 2015-08-0218 
Employee, ) 
v. ) State File No.: 44676-2015 
) 
CARDINAL LOGISTICS, ) Judge Amber E. Luttrell 
Employer, ) 
And ) 
) 
ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE CO., ) 
Insurance Carrier. ) 
) 
EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER GRANTING MEDICAL AND TEMPORARY 
DISABILITY BENEFITS 
THIS CAUSE came before the undersigned Workers' Compensation Judge upon 
the Request for Expedited Hearing (REH) filed by the employee, James McCaffery, 
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239 (2014). Mr. McCaffery sought 
medical and temporary disability benefits for an injury to his back, right shoulder, and 
left knee. The employer, Cardinal Logistics, contended that Mr. McCaffery's injury 
resulted from a non-compensable idiopathic condition or act of God barring his claim for 
workers' compensation benefits. Cardinal further raised the imported risk doctrine as a 
defense to compensability of the claim. The central legal issue for determination is 
whether Mr. McCaffery sustained a compensable work injury arising primarily out of his 
employment. 1 For the reasons set forth below the Court find Mr. McCaffery carried his 
burden of proof establishing a compensable work injury and demonstrated he is entitled 
to medical and temporary disability benefits. 
History of Claim 
Mr. McCaffery is a sixty-three-year-old resident of Shelby County, Tennessee. He 
1 Additional information regarding the technical record and exhibits admitted at the Expedited Hearing is attached as 
an Appendix. 
worked as an over-the-road truck driver for Cardinal. 
On May 19, 2015, Mr. McCaffery drove a truck for Cardinal on U.S. Highway 60 
traveling from Fort Scott, Kansas to Memphis, Tennessee. Mr. McCaffery testified he 
drove into a curve on the highway when he sneezed, causing him to run off the road. Mr. 
McCaffery testified he did not drive through a pollen cloud prior to the wreck. He does 
not suffer from seasonal allergies. Mr. McCaffery could not explain what caused him to 
sneeze. He attempted to direct the truck back onto the highway, but he "oversteered," 
causing the truck to roll over. Mr. McCaffery sustained multiple injuries in the accident. 
Mr. McCaffery testified the tow hook stored underneath the sleeper bunk dislodged when 
the truck rolled over and struck him in the back. When he unbuckled his seatbelt, he fell 
onto his right side injuring his neck and right shoulder. He injured his left knee when it 
hit the dashboard. He also sustained glass cuts and bruises to his head, face, and hands. 
Mr. McCaffery immediately reported the injury to Cardinal. He called Kerry 
Wieden, manager of operations in Memphis, who instructed him to go to the hospital. 
Emergency responders transported Mr. McCaffery by ambulance to CoxHealth South 
Hospital in Springfield, Missouri. 
Dr. Tommy Campbell treated Mr. McCaffery for multiple injuries in the 
emergency room and discharged him the same day. (Ex. 1.) He prescribed pain 
medication and muscle relaxers. He placed light-duty restrictions on Mr. McCaffery of no 
lifting, pushing, or pulling greater than five pounds, no forward bending, no stooping or 
kneeling, no power gripping, and no operating heavy equipment. He noted the light-duty 
restrictions remained in place until Mr. McCaffery followed up with Occupational 
Medicine South or his personal physician. !d. 
Subsequently, Mr. McCaffery called Mr. Wieden and asked which doctor he 
should see through workers' compensation for follow-up care. Mr. Wieden did not know 
where to send him, so they agreed Mr. McCaffery could seek treatment at Concentra? 
On May 27, 2015, Mr. McCaffery presented to Dr. John Goodfred at Concentra 
for a cervical strain, chest wall contusion, concussion, left-knee contusion, head 
contusion, lumbar contusion, and right-shoulder strain. !d. Dr. Goodfred treated him 
conservatively with medication and physical therapy. He restricted Mr. McCaffery from 
any activity, including driving, until he could return for follow-up treatment. !d. The last 
work status note dated June 10, 2015, continued Mr. McCaffery's restriction of no 
activity, including driving. !d. 
Mr. McCaffery last saw pr. Goodfred on June 18, 2015. Dr. Goodfred did not 
2 Mr. McCaffery testified he suggested Concentra because Cardinal sent employees to Concentra for physicals and 
drug screens. 
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release him at maximum medical improvement (MMI). Dr. Goodfred noted that Mr. 
McCaffery's anticipated MMI date was July 31, 2015. Dr. Goodfred's record did not 
mention any restrictions. Furthermore, there was no corresponding work status report 
admitted into evidence for the June 18, 2015 visit. Mr. McCaffery testified that Dr. 
Goodfred never returned him to full-duty work and told him not to drive at his last visit. 
Mr. McCaffery contacted Cardinal on several occasions and asked if he could return to 
light-duty work. Cardinal informed him there was no light-duty work. 
Mr. McCaffery remains off work. He testified credibly that he cannot work at this 
time because of continued symptoms in his left knee, low back, and right shoulder. His 
low-back pain makes it difficult to walk or sit in a truck for long periods. He used to sit 
for eight hours at a time while driving the truck. He currently experiences right-shoulder 
pain that travels to his neck. Mr. McCaffery also testified to strength loss in his right arm. 
He lacks strength to tum the crank to make the legs on the trailers rise up and down. He 
cannot bend over to pull the fifth wheel pin. Although he has not worked since his injury, 
he testified he believes he is still a Cardinal employee. Mr. McCaffery desires additional 
medical treatment for his injuries, so that he may return to work as an over-the-road truck 
driver. 
Cardinal filed a Notice of Denial on June 16, 2015, stating, "[I]njury occurred due 
to an idiopathic condition (sneeze)." (Ex. 3.) A Wage Statement admitted into evidence 
indicates Mr. McCaffery's temporary total disability rate is $932.80 per week. (Ex. 2.) 
Mr. McCaffery filed a Petition for Benefit Determination (PBD) on June 24, 2015, 
seeking medical and temporary disability benefits. (T.R. 1.) The parties did not resolve 
the disputed issues through mediation; therefore, the Mediating Specialist filed the 
Dispute Certification Notice on July 28, 2015. (T.R. 2.) At the Expedited Hearing, 
counsel for Cardinal advised the Court that Cardinal agrees to pay all of Mr. McCaffery's 
medical expen es related to the alleged work i.njury through June 16, 2015.3 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
The Workers' Compensation Law shall not be remedially or liberally construed in 
favor of either party but shall be construed fairly, impartially and in accordance with 
3 The Court notes on October 21, 2015, Cardinal sent an email directly to the undersigned Judge requesting the 
Court consider a new report and affidavit as a late-filed exhibit to the Expedited Hearing. The information presented 
by email to the Court was not properly admitted into evidence at the Expedited Hearing in this case. Mr. 
McCaffery's counsel also emailed the Court noting his objection to Cardinal's proposed late filing. The Court denies 
Cardinal's request. The proper procedure for such a request is filing a motion with the court clerk. No motion was 
filed by counsel; therefore, Cardinal's request is not properly before the Court. The request is further denied as 
untimely pursuant to the Bureau's Mediation and Procedure Rule 0800-02-21-.14 (2015) and the Court of Workers' 
Compensation Claims Practice and Procedure Rule 7.02. Counsel is reminded that informal communication and 
submission of information acceptable in the Request for Assistance process for pre-July I, 2014 cases is not 
acceptable procedure in post-July I, 2014 cases in the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims. 
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basic principles of statutory construction favoring neither the employee nor employer. 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2014). The employee in a workers' compensation claim 
has the burden of proof on all essential elements of a claim. Tindall v. Waring Park 
Ass'n, 725 S.W.2d 935,937 (Tenn. 1987); Scottv. Integrity Staffing Solutions, No. 2015-
01-0055, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *6 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. 
Bd. Aug. 18, 20 15). An employee need not prove every element of his or her claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence in order to obtain relief at an expedited hearing. McCord 
v. Advantage Human Resourcing, No. 2014-06-0063, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. 
LEXIS 6, at *7-8, 9 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 27, 2015). At an expedited 
hearing, an employee has the burden to come forward with sufficient evidence from 
which the trial court can determine that the employee is likely to prevail at a hearing on 
the merits. !d. 
Mr. McCaffery's injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his 
employment with Cardinal. 
To be compensable under the workers' compensation statutes, an injury must arise 
primarily out of and occur in the course and scope of the employment. Tenn. Code Ann. 
§50-6-102(13) (2014). The term "injury" is defined as "an injury by accident ... arising 
primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment, that causes death, 
disablement or the need for medical treatment of the employee." !d. For an injury to be 
accidental, it must be "caused by a specific incident, or set of incidents, arising primarily 
out of and in the course and scope of employment, and is identifiable by time and place 
of occurrence." Tenn. Code Ann.§ 50-6-102(13)(A) (2014). 
The statutory requirements that an injury arise out of and in the course of the 
employment are not synonymous "although both elements exist to ensure a work 
connection to the injury for which the employee seeks benefits." Blankenship v. Am. 
Ordnance Sys., 164 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tenn. 2005); Hosford v. Red Rover Preschool, No. 
2014-05-0002, 2014 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 1, at *19-20 (Tenn. Workers' 
Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 2, 2014). 
The phrase "in the course of' refers to time, place, and circumstances, and 
"arising out of' refers to cause or origin. "[A]n injury by accident to an 
employee is in the course of employment if it occurred while he was 
performing a duty he was employed to do; and it is an injury arising out of 
employment if caused by a hazard incident to such employment." 
Generally, an injury arises out of and is in the course and scope of 
employment if it has a rational connection to the work and occurs while the 
employee is engaged in the duties of his employment. 
Cloyd v. Hartco Flooring Co., 274 S.W.3d 638, 643 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting Orman v. 
Williams Sonoma, Inc., 803 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tenn. 1991)). 
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In this case, it is undisputed that Mr. McCaffery was where he was expected to be 
when working and was engaged in the duties of his employment with Cardinal at the time 
of his injury. Thus, the Court finds both the location and activity elements of "in the 
course and scope of his employment" are satisfied. The determinative issue in this case 
becomes whether Mr. McCaffery's injury arose primarily out of his employment. 
Mr. McCaffery argued he sustained a compensable work injury arising primarily 
out of his employment when he attempted to negotiate a tum in his truck and had a 
wreck. Mr. McCaffery cited the Tennessee Supreme Court case, Phillips v. A&H Constr. 
Co., 134 S.W.3d 145, 148 (Tenn. 2004), in support of his position and argued the facts in 
Phillips are similar to the facts in this case.4 The Court agrees. 
In Phillips, the employee drove a truck in the course and scope of his employment 
on the date of injury. !d. at 148. He hit a tractor-trailer after he lost consciousness due to 
unknown causes and suffered multiple injuries to his body as a result of the accident. !d. 
The trial court denied benefits holding, "[A ]n injury which occurs due to an idiopathic 
loss of consciousness is not compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act because 
a causal relationship cannot be shown between the employment and the loss of 
consciousness." On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and 
concluded: 
A worker need not prove that an idiopathic loss of consciousness was 
caused by his employment. An injury which occurs due to an idiopathic 
condition is compensable if an employment hazard causes or exacerbates 
the injury. The necessary causal link is between the employment and the 
accident or injury, r~ther than between the employment and the idiopathic 
episode. 
!d. at 152. 
The Court specifically addressed the hazard incident to the employment in Phillips 
and held: 
If driving a vehicle is part of an employee's job, then it is certainly a hazard 
4 Importantly, in Phillips, the Supreme Court did not base its decision or rationale on a remedial interpretation of the 
pre-July l, 2014 reform statute; thus, reliance on Phillips is appropriate in this case. "Reliance on precedent from 
the Tennessee Supreme Court is appropriate unless it is evident that the Supreme Court's decision or rationale relied 
on a remedial interpretation of pre-July I, 2014 statutes, that it relied on specific statutory language no longer 
contained in the Workers' Compensation Law, and/or that it relied on an analysis that has since been addressed by 
the general assembly through statutory amendments." McCordv. Advantage Human Resourcing, No. 2014-06-0063, 
2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *13 n.4 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 27, 2015). 
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!d. 
incident to employment. To prove that his injuries arose out of his 
employment, Phillips must prove that driving his vehicle caused or 
exacerbated his injuries, not that any condition of work caused his 
idiopathic loss of consciousness. 
Here, Cardinal raised the same or similar argument as the defendant in Phillips. 
Cardinal argued Mr. McCaffery's injuries resulted from a non-compensable idiopathic 
incident- the sneeze. It argued there was no causal link between Mr. McCaffery's 
employment and his sneeze. However, under Phillips, the Court finds the necessary 
causal link in this case is not between the employment and the sneeze. Rather, it is 
between the employment and Mr. McCaffery's injury. Moreover, just as in Phillips, the 
Court finds that Mr. McCaffery's job driving a truck was the hazard incident to his 
employment that caused his injuries. Accordingly, the Court finds Mr. McCaffery met his 
burden of proving his injury arose primarily out of his employment with Cardinal. 
Cardinal raised additional defenses to the compensability of Mr. McCaffery's 
claim. 
ActofGod 
Cardinal also argued Mr. McCaffery's sneeze, or a possible environmental 
condition causing him to sneeze, constituted an act of God that caused the wreck and Mr. 
McCaffery's injuries. Cardinal cited the Tennessee Supreme Court case, Jackson v. Clark 
and Fay, Inc., 270 S.W.2d 389, 390 (1954), in support of this defense. In Jackson, the 
employee died while riding in the employer's truck from his place of employment to the 
employer-furnished lodging during a tornado. !d. In denying benefits, the Supreme Court 
found the employee's death did not arise out of his employment and held: 
This storm was not a danger peculiar to the work in which Jackson was 
engaged. It was a danger common to the general public at the time and 
place where it occurred. It was not a hazard incident to his employment. It 
did not have its origin in a risk connected with that employment. It did not 
flow from that source as a rational consequence. The employer by the 
exercise of reasonable foresight could not have reasonably contemplated 
this hazard as a result of transporting his employees from their place of 
employment to their night quarters. 
!d. at 392. In the present case, Cardinal suggested an environmental factor, such as a 
large pollen storm, caused Mr. McCaffery's sneeze, leading to the accident. It contended 
this environmental factor constituted an act of God not unique to Mr. McCaffery, and 
under Jackson, would preclude Mr. McCaffery from workers' compensation benefits. 
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The Court respectfully disagrees with Cardinal's reasoning and finds the facts of 
this case distinguishable from the facts in Jackson. In Jackson, the act of God was a 
tornado. The tornado was not a danger or hazard unique to the employee. In the present 
case, there was no proof offered into evidence of any weather or environmental condition 
that occurred on the date and time Mr. McCaffery was injured that would constitute an 
act of God. Cardinal's argument suggesting Mr. McCaffery sneezed due to a large pollen 
storm is speculative and unsupported by the record. Mr. McCaffery disputed that he 
drove through a large pollen cloud at the time of his accident. He further testified that he 
does not know why he sneezed. He just sneezed. Based upon the proof in evidence, the 
Court finds Cardinal's act of God defense unpersuasive. 
Imported Risk Doctrine 
Alternatively, Cardinal asserted the imported risk doctrine precludes Mr. 
McCaffery from entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. In support of its 
argument, Cardinal relied upon the Tennessee Supreme Court case, Jones v. Sonoco 
Products, Inc., 1992 Tenn. Lexis 144, at *1 (Tenn. 1992). In Jones, the employee died 
from asphyxiation due to a piece of chewing gum lodged in his throat while driving a 
forklift at work. !d. There was no proof offered at trial that Mr. Jones' driving of the 
forklift caused him to choke. !d. at *7. The Court denied benefits, finding Mr. Jones' 
death by asphyxiation from swallowing gum did not arise out of his employment. !d. at 
*3. Specifically, the Court held no rational connection existed between the duties 
required by Mr. Jones' work and his swallowing of gum, which resulted in his accidental 
death. !d. at *7. "In other words, the chewing of gum was not a risk incident to Mr. 
Jones' employment." !d. The Court further stated, "It is not within the workers' 
compensation law if the injury is only coincidental, or contemporaneous, or collateral to 
the employment." !d. at *6. 
Here, Cardinal argued that Mr. McCaffery could have sneezed anywhere. Cardinal 
submitted that Mr. McCaffery's injury was coincidental, contemporaneous, or otherwise 
collateral to his job as an over-the-road truck driver, and that his injury did not arise out 
of a hazard or danger peculiar to the nature of his work. Again, the Court respectfully 
disagrees. In Jones, the employee died from asphyxiation from chewing gum. !d. at *7. It 
was coincidental that he was on a forklift at work at the time he choked on the gum. His 
death was not caused by the forklift or wrecking the forklift. Thus, there was no rational 
connection to Mr. Jones' work. 
By contrast, in the present case, the sneeze itself did not injure Mr. McCaffery. 
Mr. McCaffery's injuries arose from the truck wreck. His back injury resulted from the 
tow hook striking him in the back when the truck flipped. His right shoulder and neck 
injuries resulted from his fall onto the right side of his body after unbuckling his seat belt. 
His left knee hit the dashboard causing injury. He also sustained glass cuts and bruises to 
his head, face, and hands from the damaged truck. Again, the Court finds the truck was 
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the risk or hazard incident to Mr. McCaffery's employment providing the rational 
connection between Mr. McCaffery's job duties and his injury. Thus, the Court finds that 
Mr. McCaffery's claim for workers' compensation benefits is not barred by the imported 
risk doctrine. 
In summary, the Court finds Mr. McCaffery came forward with sufficient 
evidence from which this Court can conclude he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the 
merits on the issue of compensability. 
Temporary Disability Benefits 
Turning to temporary disability benefits, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-
207(2) (2014) provides for temporary partial disability (TPD) during the time period in 
which the injured employee is able to resume some gainful employment in a disabled 
condition, but has not reached maximum recovery. Williams v. Saturn Corp., No. M2004-
01215-WC-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1032, at *6 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Panel Nov. 
15, 2005); Jewell v. Cobble Construction and Arcus Restoration, No. 2014-05-0003, 
2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 1, at *22 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Jan. 
12, 20 15). To establish entitlement to temporary partial disability benefits, the employee 
has the burden to show he had been assigned temporary work restrictions that rendered 
him partially disabled, and the partial disability resulted in a reduced ability to work 
because the employer was unwilling or unable to return the injured worker to work at or 
above his average weekly wage. Williams, 2005 Tenn. LEXIS 1032 at *7-8. 
The medical proof indicated CoxHealth South Hospital did not excuse Mr. 
McCaffery from work completely, but restricted his work activities until he followed up 
with a personal physician. Thus, Mr. McCaffery is not entitled to temporary total 
disability benefits between May 19, 2015, and May 27, 2015. However, Mr. McCaffery's 
undisputed testimony was that he contacted Cardinal seeking light-duty work and 
Cardinal told him it had no light duty. Thus, the Court finds Mr. McCaffery came 
forward with sufficient evidence from which the Court concludes he is entitled to 
temporary partial disability between May 19, 2015, and May 27, 2015. 
The Court further finds Mr. McCaffery is entitled to temporary total disability 
(TTD) benefits. The Workers' Compensation Law allows temporary total disability 
benefits under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(1) (2014) when the disability 
is "total" and the employee is "unable to work as a result of a compensable injury." See 
Gray v. Cullom Mach., Tool & Die, Inc., 152 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tenn. 2004); Jewell, 
2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 1, at *21. 
The work status reports of Dr. Goodfred indicated he restricted Mr. McCaffery 
from "any activity, including driving" on May 27, 2015. The last work status report 
admitted into evidence dated June 10, 2015, indicated Mr. McCaffery was still restricted 
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to "no activity" and "no driving personal vehicle." Dr. Goodfred's last medical note dated 
June 18, 2015, failed to mention any work restrictions. Based upon the medical records, 
the Court finds Mr. McCaffery is entitled to temporary total disability between May 27, 
2015, and June 18, 2015. Although Dr. Goodfred did not release Mr. McCaffery at MMI 
on June 18, 2015, there is no proof before the Court at this time that Dr. Goodfred 
restricted Mr. McCaffery from work after June 18, 2015. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows: 
1. Cardinal or its workers' compensation carrier shall provide Mr. McCaffery with 
medical treatment for his injuries as required by Tennessee Code Annotated 
section 50-6-204 (2014), to be initiated by Cardinal or its workers' compensation 
carrier providing Mr. McCaffery with a panel of physicians as required by statute 
to evaluate and treat any injuries causally related to Mr. McCaffery's work injury 
ofMay 19, 2015. 
2. Cardinal or its workers' compensation carrier shall pay all outstanding bills for 
Mr. McCaffery's reasonable and necessary medical treatment for the work injury. 
Mr. McCaffery shall promptly furnish Cardinal or its workers' compensation 
carrier, through counsel, all medical bills he has received for medical treatment for 
the work injury. 
3. Cardinal or its workers' compensation carrier shall pay Mr. McCaffery past-due 
TTD benefits in the amount of$2,798.40 for a three-week period between May 27, 
2015, and June 18, 2015 at the temporary disability rate of$932.80 per week. 
4. Cardinal or its workers' compensation carrier shall pay Mr. McCaffery past-due 
TPD benefits in the amount of $932.80 for a one-week period beginning May 19, 
2015, through May 27, 2015. 
5. This matter is set for an Initial (Scheduling) Hearing on December 22, 2015, at 10 
a.m. (CDT). 
6. Unless interlocutory appeal of the Expedited Hearing Order is filed, 
compliance with this Order must occur no later than seven business days 
from the date of entry of this Order as required by Tennessee Code 
Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(3) (2014). The Insurer or Self-Insured 
Employer must submit confirmation of compliance with this Order to the 
Bureau by email to \tVCCompliance.Program@tn .gov no later than the 
seventh business day after entry of this Order. Failure to submit the 
necessary confirmation within the period of compliance may result in a 
penalty assessment for non-compliance. 
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7. For questions regarding compliance, please contact the Workers' Compensation 
Compliance Unit via email WCComplian e.Program@tn.gov or by calling (615) 
253-1471 or (615) 532-1309. 
ENTERED this the 28th day of -
Ju ge Amber E. Luttrell 
Court of Workers' Compensation Claims 
Initial (Scheduling) Hearing: 
An Initial (Scheduling) Hearing has been set with Judge Amber E. Luttrell, 
Court of Workers' Compensation Claims. You must call 901-543-2668 or toll-free at 
855-543-5046 to participate. 
Please Note: You must call in on the scheduled date/time to 
participate. Failure to call in may result in a determination of the issues without 
your further participation. All conferences are set using Central Time (CT). 
Right to Appeal.: 
Tennessee Law allows any party who disagrees with this Expedited Hearing Order 
to appeal the decision to the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. To file a Notice of 
Appeal, you must: 
1. Complete the enclosed form entitled: "Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal." 
2. File the completed form with the Court Clerk within seven business days of the 
date the Workers' Compensation Judge entered the Expedited Hearing Order. 
3. Serve a copy of the Expedited Hearing Notice of Appeal upon the opposing party. 
4. The appealing party is responsible for payment of a filing fee in the amount of 
$75.00. Within ten calendar days after the filing of a notice of appeal, payment 
must be received by check, money order, or credit card payment. Payments can be 
made in person at any Bureau office or by United States mail, hand-delivery, or 
other delivery service. In the alternative, the appealing party may file an Affidavit 
of Indigency, on a form prescribed by the Bureau, seeking a waiver of the filing 
fee. The Affidavit of Indigency may be filed contemporaneously with the Notice 
10 
of Appeal or must be filed within ten calendar days thereafter. The Appeals Board 
will consider the Affidavit of Indigency and issue an Order granting or denying 
the request for a waiver of the filing fee as soon thereafter as is 
practicable. Failure to timely pay the filing fee or fLie the Affidavit of 
lndigency in accordance with this section shall result in dismissal of the 
appeal. 
5. The parties, having the responsibility of ensuring a complete record on appeal, 
may request, from the Court Clerk, the audio recording of the hearing for the 
purpose of having a transcript prepared by a licensed court reporter and filing it 
with the Court Clerk within ten calendar days of the filing of the Expedited 
Hearing Notice of Appeal. Alternatively, the parties may file a joint statement of 
the evidence within ten calendar days of the filing of the Expedited Hearing 
Notice of Appeal. The statement of the evidence must convey a complete and 
accurate account of what transpired in the Court of Workers' Compensation 
Claims and must be approved by the workers' compensation judge before the 
record is submitted to the Clerk of the Appeals Board. 
6. If the appellant elects to file a position statement in support of the interlocutory 
appeal, the appellant shall file such position statement with the Court Clerk within 
three business days of the expiration of the time to file a transcript or statement of 
the evidence, specifying the issues presented for review and including any 
argument in support thereof. A party opposing the appeal shall file a response, if 
any, with the Court Clerk within three business days of the filing ofthe appellant's 
position statement. All position statements pertaining to an appeal of an 
interlocutory order should include: (1) a statement summarizing the facts of the 
case from the evidence admitted during the expedited hearing; (2) a statement 
summarizing the disposition of the case as a result of the expedited hearing; (3) a 
statement of the issue( s) presented for review; and ( 4) an argument, citing 
appropriate statutes, case law, or other authority. 
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APPENDIX 
Exhibits: 
1. Medical Records of: 
• CoxHealth South Emergency Department 
• · Concentra Medical Center 
2. Wage Statement 
3. Employer First Report of Work Injury and Notice of Denial of Claim 
Technical Record:5 
1. Petition for Benefit Determination (PBD), filed June 24, 2015 
2. Dispute Certification Notice (DCN), filed July 28,2015 
3. Request for Expedited Hearing (REH), filed August 26, 2015 
5 The Court did not consider attachments to the above filings unless admitted into evidence during the Expedited 
Hearing. The Court considered factual statements in the above filings or any attachments to them as allegations 
unless established by the evidence. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Expedited Hearing Order 
Granting Medical and Temporary Disability Benefits was sent to the following recipients 
by the following methods of service on this the day of October, 2015. 
Name Certified 
Mail 
Jimmy Blount, Esq. 
Employee's Attorney 
Prairie Arnold, Esq. 
Employer's Attorney 
Via Via Service sent to: 
Fax Email 
X jimmy@bountfirm.com 
X parnold@arnold-lawyers.com 
P nny Sh . , Clerk of Court 
Court of "/ orkers' Compensation Claims 
WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov 
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